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Introduction
The pro-democracy movement in post-handover Hong Kong has longbeen an intense struggle between two contending forces: on the onehand, a hybrid regime buttressed by a dense network of local business
elites and backed by its authoritarian principal, the People’s Republic of
China (Case 2008; Fong 2013); and on the other, a loosely-knitted network
of pro-democracy parties and civic groups that promotes constitutional re-
forms, scrutinises the regime, and mobilises at critical times to disrupt un-
popular government plans (Ma 2005; Cheng 2016). Since the early 2010s,
however, a new political force, broadly known as the localists (bentupai 本
土派), has emerged in the political domain. Gaining their voice through a
series of anti-mainlandisation protests, the localists rallied to defend local
autonomy, interests, and culture against what they saw as a relentless trend
of “mainlandisation.” Following the 2014 Umbrella Movement, the localists
went on to establish political parties and won a considerable number of
seats in both the 2015 District Council election and the 2016 Legislative
Council election. However, as soon as they gained a foothold in politics, the
hybrid regime swiftly moved in to clamp down on the nascent movement
with hard-line measures to exclude them from the political system. Localist
candidates were disqualified from elected offices and barred from entering
elections, and a rising countermovement against the localists has also been
launched by pro-regime groups. 
What explains the ebbs and flows of Hong Kong’s localist movement? (1)
Why did the localists grow strong after the Umbrella Movement but quickly
become marginalised? In this article, we posit that localism is not an in-
evitable product of the macro-structural social process, but an amalgam of
ideas and action logics assembled sequentially through events and discur-
sive constructions. Using Sewell’s eventful perspective, we argue that local-
ism first emerged through the interplay between anti-mainlandisation
protests and both online and intellectual discourse, and then ascended to
the political stage after the Umbrella Movement. Despite their meteoric
rise, localists’ militant actions have allowed the hybrid regime to marginalise
the nascent force through legal and non-legal repression, which has in turn
created what Okar-Lust calls a “divided structure of contestation” among
the opposition (Lust-Okar 2005). An eventful angle will allow us to under-
stand not only the origins—but also the complexity and weakness—of the
localist movement. It will demonstrate that the localists cannot be simply
understood as a singular or an inexorable force. 
Hong Kong’s localist movement
While many studies on Hong Kong politics have focused on the con-
tention between the hybrid regime and the pro-democracy forces, recent
works have started to shed light on the rise of the localist movement. Two
analytical perspectives can be delineated from these works. One perspective
tends to analyse the localist movement from a structural angle, interpreting
it as a product of Hong Kong’s socio-economic and political development
and its changing relationship with mainland China. Kwong Ying-ho attributes
the rise of localism to the “transition fatigue” of Hong Kong’s pro-democ-
racy movement and the deepening integration with mainland China (Kwong
2016). While Kaeding agrees that the “China factor” has played a crucial
role in this process, he also points to the hard-line measures under C.Y.
Leung’s administration, which together triggered political resistance espe-
cially among the younger generation in the hope of defending local interests
and identity (Kaeding 2017), a point echoed by Chan Che-Po in his obser-
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1. Throughout this article, the localist movement will be used interchangeably with localism. 
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vation of Hong Kong’s student movement after the Umbrella Movement
(Chan 2016). Without challenging the contributing role of the “China fac-
tor,” Chan argues that local socio-economic problems are also relevant in
triggering the rise of localism. Analysing the localist discourse in the media
through the framework of “discursive opportunity structure,” Chan offers a
wider range of explanation beyond political factors (Chan 2017). 
Another perspective analyses the rise of localism in terms of the devel-
opment of nationalism or shifts in national identification. A clear example
is Fong’s work, which sees localism as the manifestation of peripheral na-
tionalism that seeks to resist incorporation by the Chinese government and
its state-building nationalism (Fong 2017). Similarly, using polling data on
national identification, Yew and Kwong point to the rise of Hong Kong iden-
tity as the fundamental driving force of localism. The trend of growing local
identity, they argue, is historically rooted in the values and norms embedded
by social development since the 1970s, and is now fostered by rapid eco-
nomic integration with mainland China and Beijing’s interventionist ap-
proach. While also acknowledging this shifting trend of identification, Veg
develops a more sophisticated theoretical model to understand the nature
of identity changes in two dimensions: the framework of identification
(local versus pan-Chinese) and the mode of identification (ethno-cultural
versus civic). By focusing on several protest events, Veg observes that civic-
based identification with a local democratic community is becoming in-
creasingly incompatible with the ethno-cultural identity that is being
promoted by the Beijing government (Veg 2017). 
Both perspectives have undoubtedly contributed to a deeper understand-
ing of the fundamental drivers of the nascent localist movement. However,
there is a tendency among these works to consider localism as a structural
product that results reactively from socio-economic and political changes.
Take Fong’s work as an example: despite its extensive research, the study
characterises the localist movement as a form of peripheral nationalism re-
acting against China’s state-building nationalism. While we do not funda-
mentally disagree with such an interpretation, we argue that it might risk
underemphasising the role of agency in the process—how different social
and political actors, including activists, intellectuals, politicians, netizens,
online opinion leaders, and state actors, shape and reshape localism in a
non-linear and contingent fashion. Structural factors are no doubt still rel-
evant in explaining the rise of localism, but more attention should be paid
to the role of agency in order to understand why the localist movement
manifests in its present shape, as well as why the movement rises and falls
in terms of its political and mobilisation power, despite the structural im-
petus. An alternative analytical framework is thus needed to account for
not only the emergence, but also the vicissitudes of the localist movement. 
William Sewell’s “eventful sociology” may offer a useful framework in this
regard. Recognising the power of historical events in transforming social
structures, Sewell calls for an eventful notion of temporality to focus on
how events shape and reshape human actions and meanings across space
and time. For Sewell, events are defined loosely as “a ramified sequence of
occurrences that is recognized as notable by contemporaries, and that re-
sults in a durable transformation of structures” (Sewell 2005: 228). Distin-
guishing from what he identifies as teleological and experimental
temporality, eventful temporality assumes that social relations are charac-
terised by “path dependence, temporally heterogeneous causalities and
global contingency” (Sewell 2005: 102). This means that although events
are often path-dependent and contingent happenings that mostly repro-
duce the underlying social structure, sometimes they can transform struc-
ture by rearranging social relations and changing the cultural categories
that shape and constrain human actions. Social processes, as Sewell con-
cludes, are “inherently contingent, discontinuous and open-ended” (Sewell
2005: 110). By focusing on the disruptive power of events and the role of a
wide range of political actors, the eventful approach is thus more likely to
produce a nuanced account of socio-political changes. In our case, it will
allow us to illuminate how the localist movement in post-handover Hong
Kong is constituted and shaped by protest events, public discourse, and
regime actions.
Methodology
This article adopts a mixed method to understand the eventful develop-
ment of Hong Kong’s localist movement. First, we conducted a bottom-up
search in Wisenews, an online database of full-text newspapers, for all kinds
of protest events that took place in Hong Kong from 2008 to 2017. To en-
sure that the search results were comprehensive but did not outstrip our
ability to screen them, we limited our search to two newspapers, Ming Pao,
a widely-read paper that claims to be politically neutral, and Wen Wei Po,
a pro-Beijing, state-controlled paper. (2) Out of the search results, we iden-
tified 31 protest events that carried the aims of protecting local resources,
interests, and identity. Based on these reports, together with other related
online and offline publications, we then traced the rise and development of
the localist movement through selected protest events. Besides the localist
protests, we further identified 186 counter-protests organised by pro-regime
organisations, 31 of which were targeted localist protests, to understand
how the state responded to the nascent movement. Second, we conducted
semi-structured interviews with seven localist activists from March to July
2017 to gain an insider view of their work. Our interviewees include leaders
of localist organisations (n=2), their core members (n=2), social media opin-
ion leader (n=2), and a frequent participant of localist protests (n=1). In-
terview questions include, for example, why they decided to join the localist
bloc; what distinguishes them from traditional pro-democracy activists; how
they participated in politics; and how they perceived the prospect of local-
ism. 
The eventful rise of localism
Since the 2003 July 1 rally, when half a million citizens demonstrated
against the impending national security legislation, mass protests have be-
come inseparable from the political development of post-handover Hong
Kong. Although these protests were motivated by a wide range of issues,
from heritage preservation to the issuing of TV licenses, underlying many
of them was the determination to protect the city’s eroding civic freedom
and the aspiration of liberalising the partially democratic political system
(Ma 2005). These protests tended to follow the principle of being “peaceful,
rational, non-violent, and non-profane,” and their objective was to obtain
policy concessions from the government through large turnouts, rather than
to create chaos (Cheng 2016). Beginning from 2011, however, a new type
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2. We selected these two newspapers for the purpose of recording both the localist protests and
the counter-mobilisations organised by the pro-Beijing camp. Most of the localist protests were
likely to have been reported in Ming Pao, although recent changes to its editorship have raised
worries about its pro-Beijing tendencies. Meanwhile, most of the pro-Beijing counter-mobilisations
were likely to be captured by the state-controlled Wen Wei Po. We did not select a pro-democracy
paper because our aim is merely to record events, rather than doing content analysis on how dif-
ferent newspapers report the events. 
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of protest has come under the spotlight. Rather than mobilising on issues
related to civil liberties, political reform, or urban redevelopment, these
emerging protests focused on livelihood problems stemming from the in-
creasing interactions between Hong Kong and mainland China. Protesters
rallied on the grounds of protecting daily necessities, such as milk powder
and hospital beds, which, they complained, were often in short supply given
the influx of mainland tourists and migrants. More confrontational reper-
toires of contention, which defied the conventional protest norms of being
civil and orderly, also began to emerge. 
Dissent first began with the heated issue of birth tourism. Following the
Court of Final Appeal decision in 2001 that Chinese citizens born in Hong
Kong would enjoy the right of abode, Hong Kong saw an influx of pregnant
women visiting from mainland China to give birth to their infants, known
locally as “anchor babies.” In 2010, for instance, babies born to mainland
mothers in Hong Kong totalled 32,000, accounting for about 40% of all
births. (3) Fears that birth tourism would cause shortages of hospital re-
sources fuelled growing criticisms against these visiting pregnant women.
Tensions began to emerge online in April 2011. Netizens from the Golden
Forum, a popular Internet chatroom, planned an online “attack” on a main-
land online forum called “Community for Giving Birth in Hong Kong” by
spamming it with protest messages. Some netizens then turned to Facebook
and set up a page called “Oppose Mainland Pregnant Women Coming to
Hong Kong to Give Birth! Let’s Show 100,000 Likes to the Government.” A
strongly worded manifesto was posted: 
Giving birth is the happiest thing in life. It is also women’s natural
duty and pride. However, Hong Kong’s locust-defending politicians,
fake social workers, wily lawyers, profiteering intermediaries and hos-
pitals, and mediocre government ministers—they are all self-serving
and have betrayed local women for a long time (…). We are a group
of Hong Kong citizens who do not participate in political and factional
struggle. We are a purely self-mobilised movement whose primary
goal is to support local pregnant women and their babies (…). (4)
The growing discontent quickly spilled into the streets. From late 2011
onwards, protests against birth tourism erupted constantly, with turnouts
varying from a few hundred to thousands. Netizens, many of them young
parents, even started raising funds for their campaigns through Internet fo-
rums, namely the Golden Forum and Baby Kingdom, an online parenting
community, to place a full-page, coloured advertisement in local newspa-
pers. Emblazoned with the headline “Enough, Hongkongers!,” the advertise-
ment published on 1 February 2012 began by asking rhetorically if citizens
were willing to spend a million Hong Kong dollars every 18 minutes to raise
an anchor child. Using an overtly xenophobic tone, the advertisement urged
the government to revise Article 24 of the Basic Law and to stop pregnant
women from visiting from the mainland. Also printed on the background
of the advertisement was a locust standing on top of Lion Rock, a mountain
often used to symbolise the hardworking spirit of Hong Kong citizens. Prior
to this advertisement, the term “locusts” had been used as an insult in online
forums for quite a while when people criticised mainlanders for swarming
the city and draining its resources. In early 2011, it also became the theme
of a parody song entitled “Locusts Everywhere,” which went viral on the In-
ternet. It was, however, this advertisement that catapulted the term to pub-
lic attention. Despite sparking criticism against its offensive and
discriminatory wording, the xenophobic advertisement resonated with
those who had been outraged by the situation. It was also seen as a coun-
tering move against earlier remarks made by Peking University professor
Kong Qingdong, who called Hongkongers “bastards” and “running dogs of
the British government.” (5)
The discontent spread to a related problem—the increasing number of
mainland tourists visiting Hong Kong. Since the introduction of the Indi-
vidual Visit Scheme in 2003, which was part of the Closer Economic Part-
nership Arrangement (CEPA) to boost local tourism, the number of mainland
tourists has grown exponentially. The liberalisation scheme not only led to
overcrowding in public transport and shopping areas, but also altered Hong
Kong’s retail landscape as jewellery shops and pharmacies began to mush-
room in urban areas mainly to serve mainland visitors. An incident at the
Dolce & Gabbana (D&G) flagship store crystallised the growing discontent.
In early January 2012, following reports that a security guard at the store
had stopped a photographer from taking pictures of the shop and allegedly
said that only mainlanders would be allowed to do so, several rallies were
held in front of the store, with turnouts ranging from a few hundred to over
a thousand. The boiling anger eventually forced the Italian fashion brand to
release an official apology to placate public outrage. 
The photo ban incident bolstered anti-mainlandisation sentiment and gal-
vanised attention on the issue of parallel trading. Due to the rising purchas-
ing power of mainland citizens and their growing demand for quality
products, parallel traders, some of whom are mainland visitors taking ad-
vantage of multiple entry visas (others are local citizens), have seized the
opportunity to smuggle highly-demanded goods, such as baby formula and
diapers, across the border. These activities have caused shortages of house-
hold goods in many North District towns bordering Shenzhen and exacer-
bated the problem of overcrowding in streets and public transports.
Emboldened by the recent success of the D&G protest, netizens again called
for protests through Facebook and online forums. For several days in mid-
September 2012, hundreds of protesters, many wearing facemasks to con-
ceal their identity, (6) gathered around the Sheung Shui MTR station and
yelled insults at parallel traders, calling them “locusts” and “chee-na,” a
derogatory term for China often associated with its use by the Japanese
during the Second World War. Given the name “Liberate Sheung Shui,” these
protests involved intense physical clashes between protesters and those
they identified from appearance as parallel traders, which was partly in-
tended as a strategy to gain public attention and force the authorities to
take action. 
Some netizens went offline and established an advocacy group called
“North District Parallel Imports Concern Group” to coordinate the actions.
Intermittent protests continued into early 2013, forcing the railway author-
ities to set restrictions on carry-on luggage on trains and the government
to eventually impose a two-can quota on baby formula. While the problem
of parallel trading was temporarily eased, anti-mainlandisation sentiment
continued to intensify over the following months. Numerous groups, many
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3. “Chinese ‘Birth Tourists’ to Hong Kong Double,” The Telegraph, 9 February 2012, https://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/hongkong/9072457/Chinese-birth-tourists-to-Hong-Kong-
double.html (accessed on 26 April 2018).  
4. Facebook page of “Oppose Mainland Pregnant Women Coming to Hong Kong to Give Birth! Let’s
Show 100,000 Likes to the Government,” https://www.facebook.com/itstimetosayno/ (accessed
on 27 April 2018).
5. “HK People Labelled as Dogs by Mainlander,” South China Morning Post, 21 January 2012. 
6. One interviewee, who is a frequent participant in localist protests, said that he wore a facemask
as a preparatory measure for more confrontational protest actions, so that he would not be recog-
nised by the police from photos or videos of the protest. Interview with Freddie Wong in a café
in Hong Kong, 5 April 2017. 
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of which first emerged online, were established with an anti-mainlandisa-
tion agenda and the objective of protecting local interests and culture. In
early 2014, some of these groups formed an ad hoc coalition under the
banner of “anti-mainlandisation and anti-colonisation.” After mobilising a
rally on New Year’s Day in 2014, the coalition, led by Leung Kam Sing, a
founder of the “North District Parallel Imports Concern Group,” organised a
protest on Tsim Sha Tsui’s Canton Road in early February aimed at “expelling
the locusts.” Scuffles broke out as protesters waved slogans and shouted
insulting remarks at mainland shoppers, and as they confronted pro-Beijing
countermovement groups. 
The increasing number of anti-mainlandisation protests, as shown in Fig-
ure 1, shows the symptom of increasing socio-economic interaction be-
tween Hong Kong and mainland China. Although the two economies were
interconnected long before the handover, the process of integration accel-
erated after 2008 as China had joined the World Trade Organisation and
was set to become a global economic powerhouse. The rising purchasing
power of Chinese citizens fuelled a spending spree on items ranging from
daily goods to luxury merchandise to offshore properties. Hong Kong’s econ-
omy no doubt has benefited from mainlanders’ growing affluence thanks
to the city’s geographical proximity to the mainland, but the increasing in-
flux of capital and people has also brought adverse impact on local liveli-
hood, as manifested by the problem of tourism and parallel trading, which
the HKSAR government has failed to address. 
The fact that these anti-mainlandisation sentiments were framed as a
matter of resource competition as opposed to more overtly political con-
cerns makes an important point. Previous protests have not directly touched
upon these problems, nor have they engaged seriously with the question of
how to deal with the rising political and economic power of China. Even
though protests such as the Anti-Express Rail-link movement did look at
the issue of cross-border integration, the focus was more on abstract issues
such as urban redevelopment rather than on the tangible impact on citizens’
everyday lives. That these anti-mainlandisation protests directly addressed
these livelihood concerns partly explains why they gained traction so
quickly after they broke out. It is important to mention, however, that al-
though these concerns were tangible, they were sometimes exaggerated
and amplified by political actors to capture societal and media attention.
As Leung Kam Shing, convenor of the “North
District Parallel Imports Concern Group,” said
in a radio interview, “We have exhausted every
possible milder option that we could think of;
that is why we staged this kind of more radical,
direct protest to draw the government’s atten-
tion.” (7) By participating in these actions,
protesters engaged in what Ip calls “boundary-
making practices” with visible targets (Ip 2015),
namely pregnant women, parallel traders, and
shoppers, through which they empowered
themselves as political subjects vis-a-vis what
they perceived as symbols of the expanding
economic presence and power of China. More
importantly, the protests helped to create a
loose network of activists and supporters
aligned around the imperative to protect the
interests of the local population and autonomy
from the growing influence of China, which
would be reactivated after the Umbrella Movement. One of the leaders of
the Hong Kong National Party, a localist party formed in 2016, said that
while he did not participate in these protests, the idea of protecting local in-
terests that they promoted did leave a strong impression on him. (8)
New organisational logic and repertoires could also be observed from these
protests. Unlike previous protests, which were mostly organised by traditional
pro-democracy political parties and civic groups, these protests were initiated
and coordinated through online platforms, namely Facebook and Internet cha-
trooms, by netizens who had little or no experience in politics and preferred
to conceal their identity. Empowered by social media while lacking a cen-
tralised leadership, these citizen self-mobilisations (Lee 2015) are close to what
Bennett and Segerberg call “crowd-enabled connective actions,” in which
protesters adjoin in physical spaces through the mediation of digital networks
and act under personalised action frames rather than collective ones (Bennett
and Segerberg 2013). Their repertoires also deviated from previous protests.
Eschewing the peaceful and nonviolent protest ethos that has long charac-
terised the city’s political activism (Ku 2004; Cheng 2016), protesters employed
militant and confrontational tactics to advance their objectives. And even
though their objective was still to press for certain changes in government
policies, their protest targets were not so much the government authorities
but rather specific groups of people. As such, these localist protests no longer
resemble what Ma Ngok calls “civil society in defence,” where citizens rally to
defend their civil and political rights against authoritarian advances (Ma 2005).
Although these protests were still defensive in the sense of protecting the sta-
tus quo, they were grounded in the belief that militant and aggressive actions
are more effective in reversing and resisting socio-political changes. 
Fighting a two-way battle
While this sequence of anti-mainlandisation protests created a loose com-
munity of like-minded activists and supporters, localism had not yet been
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Note: Anti-mainlandisation protests include rallies and demonstrations on issues such as
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Figure 1 – Number of anti-mainlandisation protests from 2009 to 2016
defined and articulated as a political discourse. One way for localist activists
to carve out a new discursive space in the political domain is to differentiate
themselves from pro-democracy parties and groups. Hence, rather than
joining with veteran democrats as allies, localists considered them com-
petitors, arguing that their dominance of the political opposition was the
reason that the pro-democracy movement had been stagnant. A new bat-
tlefront was thus waged against the pro-democracy camp, the ensuing
power struggle demonstrated by the discursive construction of the term
“leftards” (zuojiao 左膠). This term was invented by a political commentator,
Kay Lam, initially to characterise pro-democracy activists who sympathise
with Chinese immigrants owing to their liberal and cosmopolitan values. (9)
It later gained traction in online forums and social media platforms during
the anti-mainlandisation protests, in which “leftards” were attacked for
being the “collaborators” who have aggravated the influx of mainlanders. 
The usage of “leftards” not only became a discursive weapon for localists
to shore up political influence, but also expanded to take aim at a broader
range of behaviour. The annual June 4th candlelight vigil in Victoria Park, at
which hundreds of thousands of citizens have mourned the deaths of par-
ticipants in the 1989 Tiananmen Movement, became a target of the local-
ists. Localists accused the organiser, the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of
Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (hereafter the Alliance), of cap-
italising on the vigil to garner votes while promoting a pan-Chinese identity.
The latter, localists argued, was manifested in the theme of the 2013 can-
dlelight vigil, which included the slogan “love the country, love the people”
(aiguo aimin 愛國愛民). Leaders and participants were labelled “pan-Chinese
idiots” (dazhonghuajiao 大中華膠), a variant of “leftard,” because they were
seen as putting the goal of China’s democratisation before the pursuit of
local democracy and the protection of local interests. Such a view was ac-
tively promoted by Chin Wan, an academic seen by many as the ideological
godfather of localism. After the 2013 vigil, Chin wrote on his Facebook page: 
Hong Kong cannot be rescued. This is not because of the Chinese
Communist Party, but because she has been kidnapped by the pan-
democrats and the Alliance. The Alliance has kidnapped Hong Kong
people’s conscience. These people kneel and pray at its evil altar every
year. When there are righteous people who vow to boycott the Al-
liance and smash the altar so as to liberate them, their attitude is to
stay with the kidnappers, cursing and resisting their liberators. (10)
Chin argued that the tendency of traditional democrats to fight for China’s
democratisation is due to their Chinese nationalist ideology, which also ex-
plained why they were reluctant to defend the boundary between Hong
Kong and the mainland. In his influential book, Hong Kong as a City-state,
which later became a “manifesto” for localism, Chin propounds the idea of
city-state, an autonomous and de facto independent political entity that
would best serve the interests of Hong Kong (Chin 2013). Chin argues that
Hong Kong had in fact been ruled as a de facto city-state under British colo-
nial rule and the early handover years. But such a status has deteriorated
since 2003 with the influx of mainland migrants and tourists, which
threaten local institutions and social customs. In Chin’s view, it is erroneous
to think that China’s democratisation would bring about democracy in Hong
Kong. Even if China democratises, he argues, the lack of traditional culture
and social trust in China, which had been destroyed under Communist rule,
would result in a kind of fascist politics that would subordinate Hong Kong
under centralised control (Chin 2013: 51-52). In this regard, a “Hong Kong-
first” approach fighting for a hard boundary with the mainland will be the
best solution to defend Hong Kong’s city-state autonomy, through which
traditional Chinese culture and the Cantonese language can be preserved
and genuine democracy can be achieved. 
While Chin’s bold theories do not seem to have gained broad support, his
harsh criticism of the June 4th candlelight vigil was nevertheless influential.
After that, localist groups began to organise parallel commemorations in
other venues. In 2013, netizens started an alternative vigil outside the Tsim
Sha Tsui Cultural Centre. In the following year, the Student Union of the
University of Hong Kong initiated a parallel vigil on campus, claiming a
turnout of 1,000 people. Vowing that Hong Kong people have no responsi-
bility to build a democratic China, these parallel vigils discarded the rituals
seen in the Victoria Park ceremony, such as singing songs, as well as any
symbols and references that might invoke Chinese nationalist sentiments.
Organisers argued that the commemoration should be grounded in univer-
sal values (such as human rights) rather than patriotic or nationalistic values,
and should focus on the local significance of June 4th. Under mounting
pressure from localist groups, the Alliance eventually backed down and
dropped the slogan “love the country, love the people” from the 2013
theme. The style of the vigil was also modified to appeal to a younger au-
dience, such as by inviting young people as speakers. 
Besides referring to those who embrace Chinese nationalism, the term
“leftards” was also employed by the localists to attack social activists who
have adopted a more moderate protest approach and a more tolerant at-
titude towards mainlanders. More specifically, their target was those who
led a series of heritage preservation campaigns from 2005 to 2007 and later
the Anti-Express Rail-link movement. Mobilising under the name of “post-
80s youths” and forming groups such as Local Action, this earlier generation
of “localists” was among the first to draw attention to local consciousness.
Aligning with traditional democrats while differentiating themselves from
them, the “post-80s youths” called for a new way of reforming the en-
trenched political structure by focusing on a range of issues outside consti-
tutional reform (Lam-Knott 2018). However, their liberal orientation also
became a point of criticism for localists. Unwilling to endorse localists’ anti-
immigrant attitudes and their xenophobic actions in the anti-mainlandisa-
tion protests, these activists were branded as “leftards” who were incapable
of protecting local interests and standing up to Beijing. They were also ac-
cused of inhibiting protests in a way that prevented these protests from
achieving successful outcomes. This kind of criticism emerged in the 2012
Anti-National Education Movement, when protest leaders were blamed for
withdrawing just as the government offered concessions. A participant,
Shandia, who became a localist activist and a regular media contributor, re-
called how she felt disappointed with the movement leaders during that
time, and how this turned her into a sceptic of peaceful and non-violent
protests. (11)
Localists’ struggle against what they branded as “leftards” became most
salient during the 2014 Umbrella Movement, when multiple protest camps
emerged in reaction to the repressive use of tear gas by the police. In the
Mongkok protest camp, which attracted protesters with localist and militant
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orientations, condemnation of “leftards” became visible from the start.
Posters urging protesters to “beware of the leftards,” and sometimes even
listing the names of prominent “leftard” activists, could be seen on lamp-
posts and sidewalks around the camp. Such tensions were aggravated by
the ensuing dynamics in the Mongkok camp. As protesters defended the
camp against the incursion of mobsters, counter-protesters, and police of-
ficers, these militant actions lent legitimacy to the framing of the Mongkok
camp by the localists as their stronghold. Andy Chan, founder of the Hong
Kong National Party, said that his localist political beliefs and the idea of
organising a political party were fermented in Mongkok, where he fought
vehemently against the counterforces and where he made the first public
speech of his life. (12) As Civic Passion similarly wrote later in their book doc-
umenting what they call the “Umbrella Revolution” (Passion Times 2016): 
In Mongkok, protesters kept on resisting against the enemies, and
this allowed localist consciousness to gradually take over the protest
camp. (…) From now on, localist consciousness will be unstoppable. 
Left-wing activists in the Mongkok camp were gradually marginalised, par-
ticularly after the so-called “hotpot incident,” in which they were re-
proached for turning a serious protest into entertainment (Yuen 2018).
The electoral success of localism
The “failure” of the Umbrella Movement to achieve any concessions from
the authorities was a traumatic experience for localist supporters who had
committed to the protracted protest. It bolstered their long-standing
grievances against veteran pro-democracy activists and eventually fo-
mented the emergence of a localist faction. Two factors were particularly
important in coalescing the localist faction from a group of loosely con-
nected netizens that mobilises sporadically. First, the idea of militant resis-
tance, as well as the belief that a more distinct boundary should be drawn
between Hong Kong and China, became more deeply ingrained into the lo-
calist discourse. Having experienced police brutality during the Umbrella
Movement and seeing the unyielding stance of Beijing on political reform,
localists became convinced that democracy or autonomy under “one coun-
try, two systems” would no longer be possible. (13) As a result, they became
more identified with the localist camp and more outspoken in promoting
its causes, from the protection of Hong Kong’s cultural identity to political
independence. Second, localist activists became more inclined to organise.
Since the Umbrella Movement, numerous organisations advocating localist
ideologies have been established. Disappointed with veteran democrats and
those branded as “leftards” in the struggle for democracy, localist activists
saw the need to cultivate a strong organisational base and leadership in
order to expand their political influence. (14) As a result, not only did they
attempt to dismantle traditional pro-democracy organisations, such as the
Hong Kong Federation of Students, they also established new organisations
that would help them gather resources and groom new representatives who
would stand for localist ideals inside the political system. 
These newly-emerged localist organisations can be divided into two cat-
egories with regards to how and where they promote the localist agenda.
The first category consists of political parties or activist groups aimed at
mobilising protests and contesting elections. Usually treating territory-wide
political issues as their pivotal focus, these new parties, despite their shared
faith in political breakthrough, are very different in terms of their political
ideologies and attitudes towards the traditional pro-liberal bloc. On one
side of the spectrum are organisations with a moderate agenda, which pro-
mote the right to self-determination and lean closer to the traditional pro-
democracy camp. An example is Demosisto, which evolved from Scholarism,
a student activist organisation that led the Anti-National Education Move-
ment in 2012. On the opposite end of the spectrum are those with a much
sharper localist agenda as well as deeper animosities towards the traditional
pan-democrats. An example here is Hong Kong Indigenous, which was es-
tablished in early 2015. The party not only promotes Hong Kong’s indepen-
dence but also valorises the militant tactics that protesters used in the
Umbrella Movement. Their most symbolic action was the “Liberate
Protests,” which were revived in the early 2015 to target parallel traders
and mainland tourists. During these protests, in which Hong Kong Indige-
nous often played a leading role, protesters’ tactics became much more
confrontational and militant than a few years ago. Not only did protesters
attempt to disrupt the business of pharmacies that sold goods to parallel
traders, they even physically assaulted suspected traders and harassed
tourists. (15) Another close example is the Hong Kong National Party.
Founded in March 2016, the party is unambiguous in supporting Hong Kong
independence. Less active in mobilising militant protests and more secretive
in operation, it promotes its pro-independence agenda through activities
from staging large rallies and organising forums in university campuses, to
distributing leaflets on the streets. (16) Also clear in their pro-independence
stance is Student Localism, a localist group formed by secondary school
students. Its convenor, Tony Chung, said that they aim to emulate the suc-
cess of Scholarism in promoting political independence among students. (17)
The second category consists of community-based organisations aimed
at building up grassroots networks for the localist movement and promoting
its ideas on an everyday basis through the provision of community services.
Examples of these new community-based organisations include Kowloon
East Community, Shatin Community Network, and Tin Shui Wai New Force.
Unlike the territory-wide political parties, these organisations are based in
local districts and tend to avoid identifying themselves explicitly as localist
while serving their communities. Their attitude towards the traditional pan-
democrats is also much softer than the localist political parties, as indicated
by how they have avoided competing directly against pan-democrat can-
didates in local elections. In the 2015 District Council election, representa-
tives from a few of these community-based organisations successfully won
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seats in some districts, including Kwun Tong and Sha Tin. Youngspiration,
which started off as a community-based organisation and later rebranded
itself as a territory-wide political party, also managed to capture one seat
in Hung Hom.
The LegCo by-election in February 2016 triggered by the resignation of
former lawmaker Ronnie Tong is often regarded as a climax of the localist
movement. Despite the slim chance of winning, Edward Leung, the
spokesman for Hong Kong Indigenous, entered the by-election to challenge
Alvin Yeung from the Civic Party, who was widely expected to “inherit”
Tong’s seat. The civil unrest in Mongkok on the first day of the Lunar New
Year in 2016 became a turning point for Leung’s campaign. Classified later
by the government as the “Mongkok Riot” but known by supporters and
sympathisers as the “Fishball Revolution,” the incident was sparked by a
government crackdown on unlicensed street vendors. As hygiene officers
attempted to remove the hawkers, Leung’s party, Hong Kong Indigenous,
called on its supporters to protect them. Tensions further escalated as the
police arrived and sent in a portable podium for crowd control. Angry
protesters then clashed violently with armoured police officers, who at-
tempted to clear them from the streets with batons and pepper spray. After
warning shots were fired, protesters began to attack the police by throwing
glass bottles, pallets, and bricks dug out of the pavement. Skirmishes lasted
until the following morning, and many were arrested as a result. Despite
the violent outcome, Leung’s leadership in the unrest gained popularity and
sympathy, not only from those who were sympathetic to the localist cause
but also from some in the traditional pro-democracy camp. Eventually,
Leung captured 15% of the vote, an indication that he would stand a high
chance of winning the upcoming general election. After Leung’s success, the
localist camp was characterised by commentators as the “third force.” (18)
Indeed, in the general election held a few months later, even though Edward
Leung was disqualified due to his pro-independence stance, a point to which
we will soon return, two Youngspiration members and four self-determinists
captured seats in the Legislative Council. The results were widely interpreted
as a triumph for the localist movement. 
No comprehensive surveys have yet been conducted to determine the
background, class profile, and political activities of people who self-identify
as localists. However, some existing analyses might provide us with a better
understanding of the localists. According to an analysis done by a local
media organisation on the LegCo by-election results, the electoral districts
where Edward Leung received the most votes were mainly public housing
estates, which typically had a higher proportion of registered voters be-
tween 18 and 25 years old. (19) This shows that youngsters from less well-
off socioeconomic conditions were more inclined to vote for the localists.
However, despite the electoral surge of the localists, a survey conducted in
2016 by the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey of the
Chinse University of Hong Kong shows that the public in general had a more
negative impression of the localists as compared with impressions of the
pan-democrats and the pro-Beijing forces, especially among people over 25
years old. (20) These conflicting findings demonstrate that public attitudes
towards the localists remain divided. The electoral rise of localist political
parties may merely be the result of growing support from youngsters, rather
than from across different generations. 
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the localist camp is far from a uni-
fied group; it remains deeply fragmented by ideological fault lines. Several
factions could be characterised. The nationalists (minzupai 民族派), which
include Hong Kong Indigenous, Youngspiration, and some small localist com-
munity organisations, emphasise the importance of protecting local cultural
values and cultivating nationalist consciousness. The constitutionalists (zhi-
xianpai 制憲派), represented by the electoral alliance of three political or-
ganisations—Hong Kong Resurgence Order, Proletariat Political Institute,
and Civic Passion—promote the refinement of the Basic Law through a de
facto referendum for perpetual autonomy after the promise that Hong
Kong’s way of life and freedoms would remain unchanged for 50 years ex-
pires in 2047. Meanwhile, the self-determinists (zijuepai 自決派) also pro-
mote Hongkongers’ right to self-determination through a referendum but
take a moderate line closer to that of the veteran democrats. Comprising
newly established parties such as Demosisto and independent activists such
as Eddie Chu, Edward Yiu, and Lau Siu-lai, self-determinists are regarded by
hard-core localists more as members of the pan-democrats than members
of the localist camp. 
State responses to delegitimise the localists
In response to the rise of the localist movement, the HKSAR government
took immediate steps to stem its growth. In the Mongkok unrest, more than
60 protesters were arrested, including Ray Wong and Edward Leung, leaders
of Hong Kong Indigenous. Many of them were later charged with rioting, il-
legal assembly, and assaulting police officers. The government and politi-
cians from the pro-establishment camp staged a high profile condemnation
of the violent actions. Although the incident helped to bolster Edward
Leung’s support in the subsequent by-elections, the violent unrest under-
mined public support on a broader scale and lent the hybrid regime a new
source of legitimacy to carry on the repression of the localist movement. 
Political measures: Disqualification from elections
An immediate step taken by the HKSAR government was to bar the lo-
calists or those who share similar ideals from entering the city’s legislature.
In the 2016 LegCo election, a new administrative measure was added in the
nomination process. Candidates were now required to sign a confirmation
form, which requires candidates to declare that they will uphold the Basic
Law and recognize that Hong Kong is an inalienable part of China. (21) The
form provides a new regulatory checkpoint for the Electoral Affairs Com-
mission (EAC), an administrative body appointed by the Chief Executive, to
screen candidates. As a result, six election hopefuls had their nominations
invalidated by the EAC returning officers (who are often civil servants). This
included Edward Leung, who stood a high chance of winning if he were al-
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lowed to run, and Andy Chan from the Hong Kong National Party. The de-
cision sparked a mix of anger and confusion as candidates from the pan-
democratic camp were validated even though they refused to sign the form.
In the case of Edward Leung, even though he did sign the form and publicly
disavowed his pro-independence stance, his candidacy was still rejected on
the grounds that he had made such comments before. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the invalidation, the election achieved a
record turnout and brought seven localist candidates into the legislature.
This strengthened the resolve of the government to make further advances
on the localist movement. Swiftly after the oath-taking ceremony, which
has traditionally been a protest opportunity for pro-democracy candidates,
LegCo rejected the appointment of two pro-independence lawmakers from
Youngspiration, Sixtus “Baggio” Leung and Yau Wai Ching. The decision was
based on the argument that the two lawmakers did not show genuine sup-
port for the Basic Law in their oath-taking, during which they carried flags
printed with “Hong Kong is not China” and used a derogatory word for China
as protest measures. While the government filed a judicial review to get the
court’s endorsement, the National People’s Congress weighed in to establish
specific guidelines on oath-taking. In November that year, the High Court
ruled in favour of LegCo’s decision, even though the ruling stopped short of
directly applying the NPC’s interpretation. 
Emboldened by the ruling, LegCo further disqualified four pro-democracy
legislators in December 2016 for their “insincere” oaths. A few months later,
the Court of First Instance again ruled in favour of the government, this
time citing not only local laws but also the NPC’s interpretation of the
guidelines of oath-taking. By then, six lawmakers had been unseated, strip-
ping the pro-democracy camp of their majority in the geographical con-
stituencies, together with their veto power in blocking government bills. In
the March 2018 by-election that aimed to fill the seats of four disqualified
lawmakers, three candidates—Agnes Chow, Ventus Lau, and James Chan—
had their nominations invalidated by the returning officers on similar
grounds. While Lau and Chan were invalidated based on their pro-indepen-
dence stances, Chow, a Demosisto member who was expected to win, was
rejected on the grounds that her party advocates self-determination. In the
end, amidst a low voter turnout, the pro-democracy camp only managed
to recapture two of the four contested seats, with the other two lost to the
pro-Beijing camp. Meanwhile, Andy Chan’s election petition to nullify the
2016 LegCo election was rejected by the court. Confirming the NPC’s in-
terpretation of the Basic Law, the judge ruled that the EAC had the power
to issue the confirmation form and screen out candidates who do not show
the intent to uphold the Basic Law and swear allegiance to the HKSAR. 
Social measures: Countermovements
Another strategy that the hybrid regime uses to clamp down on the lo-
calist movement is to tolerate countermovements that target the localist
movement. This strategy is commonly found in other hybrid regime con-
texts, such as Russia and Venezuela, where the state sponsors social organ-
isations and protest groups to bolster its legitimacy and counterbalance
opposition groups (Robertson 2011; Handlin 2017). From 2011 to 2013,
several pro-regime countermovement groups have also emerged in Hong
Kong. This includes Caring Hong Kong Power, Voice of Loving Hong Kong,
Defend Hong Kong Campaign, Justice Coalition, Sounds of Silence, Silent
Majority, Virtue Dynamics, and Hong Kong Action, which formed a loose
coalition known as the “Love Hong Kong Faction.” Fashioning as citizen-
based organisations and widely believed to be sponsored by pro-Beijing or-
ganisations, (22) these groups initially focused on staging protests against the
pro-democracy political parties and organising demonstrations in support
of government policies. In the case of Caring Hong Kong Power, the group
gained attention by attacking the Civic Party for supporting the rights of
anchor babies, new immigrants, and domestic helpers and hence “betraying”
the interests of local people. Meanwhile, Voice of Loving Hong Kong took a
more “moderate” approach by organising forums and petitions in support
of government policies and officials. While taking slightly different lines,
these groups tend to respond quickly to new political opportunities. For in-
stance, after the Occupy Central movement was proposed, these groups or-
ganised a series of protests and petitions to counter the civil disobedience
campaign. A coalition known as the Alliance for Peace and Democracy was
also established in July 2014, comprising more than 1,500 pro-Beijing po-
litical parties, industry associations, and mass organisation, to rally against
Occupy Central. Together, these pro-regime forces played a crucial role in
creating chaos in the protest camp and thereby constraining leaders’ strate-
gic moves, which enervated the 79-day Umbrella Movement (Yuen and
Cheng 2017). 
The rise of the localist movement offered another countermobilisation
opportunity for pro-regime groups, this time through opposing indepen-
dence and defending Chinese identity. Its early manifestation could be seen
during the Expel the Locusts Protest on Canton Road in early 2014, when
the Voice of Loving Hong Kong staged a parallel demonstration against the
localist protesters. But the anti-independence countermovement took more
concrete shape after high-level officials made rhetorical attacks on the lo-
calist movement. In 2015, then Chief Executive C.Y. Leung called on Under-
grad, a student publication at the University of Hong Kong, and denounced
its editorial board for advocating the idea of a Hong Kong nation. This trig-
gered a growing spate of criticisms from pro-Beijing elites and media against
the budding localist movement, which escalated after the Mongkok unrest
and peaked in the oath-taking saga. A new coalition, known as the Alliance
Against Insulting China and Hong Kong Independence, was established as a
result. In October 2016, the new Alliance staged a protest to call for the
disqualification of the two Youngspiration lawmakers. (23) A month later, it
held another large rally outside LegCo to demonstrate against pro-indepen-
dence calls and support Beijing’s interpretation of the Basic Law, claiming
a turnout of 40,000. (24)
Figure 2 displays the frequency of countermobilisations from 2010 to
2017. While these countermobilisations were typically aimed at supporting
government policies or officials, supporting the police, and targeting pro-
democracy protests before 2014, countermobilisations against indepen-
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dence or other localist causes made up a significant part of their activity in
2015 and 2016. Although the overall number of the latter dropped in 2017,
the localist movement still offered an easy prey for pro-regime groups to
countermobilise whenever political opportunities arose. For instance, in
September 2017, following the display of banners supporting independence
in numerous university campuses, a pro-Beijing group held a protest at the
Chinese University of Hong Kong threatening to tear down independence-
themed posters. On the very same day, organisers of a separate anti-inde-
pendence rally held at Tamar Park called on the University of Hong Kong to
sack Occupy Central leader and law professor Benny Tai. (25)
There is no solid evidence that pro-regime groups are directly mobilised
by the hybrid regime or the Chinese government, except sporadically anec-
dotal reports by the media that showed linkages between these groups and
pro-regime elites. Nor did they seem to have directly de-mobilised the lo-
calist movement. Instead, these countermovements were aimed more at
manufacturing and displaying public disapproval against the localist move-
ment. They served to make the talk of independence or self-determination
taboo, drawing a line between what is politically permissible and what is
not. This tactic seemed to have achieved some success. For instance, after
Au Nok-hin entered the 2018 by-election on behalf of the disqualified
Agnes Chow, Au avoided any explicit mention of self-determination, prob-
ably to minimise the risk of disqualification. Furthermore, due to the exclu-
sion of localist candidates, the election no longer explicitly featured any
slogans or policy platforms among the election hopefuls in support of in-
dependence or self-determination. 
Excluding the localists: Towards a divided structure
of contestation 
The disqualification saga and the rising trend of countermovements both
played an important role in excluding localists from the political system,
resulting in what Ellen Lust-Okar calls a “divided structure of contestation”
(Lust-Okar 2005). In many authoritarian and hybrid regimes, Lust-Okar ob-
serves that incumbents can create institutions to structure the opposition
through holding elections and setting rules regarding the legal eligibility of
candidates and parties. Incumbents can either include or exclude opposition
groups categorically, creating a unified struc-
ture of contestation (or unified SoC, e.g. Jor-
dan and Egypt under Nasir and Sadat); or
allow some opposition groups to participate
legally while excluding others, fostering a di-
vided structure of contestation (or divided
SoC, e.g. Morocco and Egypt under Mubarak).
Under the latter, political opposition permitted
to participate in the system is more likely to
become reluctant to mobilise against the
regime or make radical demands out of fear of
being ousted from the system. Similar struc-
tures have been observed in Russia, which
under President Vladimir Putin has developed
a registration system to exclude opposition
parties and politicians from electoral compe-
tition (Robertson 2011: 162); and in Venezuela,
where some opposition parties were directly
banned by the government from running for
presidential elections. (26) In these contexts, scholars have noted how oppo-
sition becomes divided on myriad issues, such as whether to participate in
future elections, whether to form electoral coalitions, or whether to accept
election results (Gandhi and Reuter 2013).
In the case of Hong Kong, while opposition parties and politicians had al-
ways been allowed to stand for elections and enter the legislature under a
unified SoC, electoral disqualification from 2016 to 2018 created a divided
SoC that includes or excludes opposition candidates based on their or their
party’s stance on the issue of independence or self-determination. Under
this system, EAC-appointed returning officers, acting as gatekeepers, enjoy
discretionary power to screen candidates based not only on their self-dec-
laration, but also on their past remarks or behaviour. The result is a frag-
mented political opposition: between those who are allowed inside the
system, namely traditional pro-democracy parties such as the Democratic
Party and the Civic Party, and those who are banned from it, namely localist
parties such as Demosisto, Youngspiration, and Hong Kong Indigenous. While
the former may be increasingly tamed by the fear of being excluded from
the system, the latter may become critical of their counterparts for being
co-opted into the system. The structure is further reinforced by pro-regime
countermobilisations, which are discursively reshaping the boundary of po-
litical correctness. By controlling where the legal and discursive boundary
lies, the hybrid regime can thus manipulate the behaviour of opposition
groups and pit them against one another. 
Fragmentation among the localists has also weakened their ability to pro-
mote a credible political alternative to the existing agenda set out by the
traditional democrats, which aims to maximize democracy under the pre-
sent system. Although localist groups share the basic objective of contesting
the constitutional framework of “one country, two systems,” they differ
widely in their relationship with the legal opposition and their strategies in
achieving their political goals. While self-determinists have a closer rela-
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tionship with veteran democrats and tend to avoid identifying with pro-in-
dependence discourse, they are also not seen by pro-independence localists
as part of the localist camp. Even among the pro-independence localists,
factional strife remains rampant. Except during the election cycles, cooper-
ation between these localist groups has been almost non-existent. More-
over, given that they are unable to contest elections, it has become much
harder for them to solicit popular support. As a result, the divided structure
of contestation has become further divided in multiple layers. 
Conclusion 
This article has analysed the rise and fall of the localist movement in post-
handover Hong Kong from an eventful perspective. Rather than seeing the
movement as a product of structural political and socioeconomic changes, we
have examined how different state and societal actors shape and reshape the
movement through events and discursive constructions. Following Sewell’s
eventual approach, our analysis helps to dispel two common misconceptions
about the localist movement. First, localism is not a singular force with a com-
mon political agenda; instead, it comprises multiple factions that only share the
basic goal of defending the local autonomy and the interests of the local pop-
ulation, but differ widely in terms of their ideologies and action logics. Second,
localism is not, as it stands, an inexorable force that is set to propel the pro-
democracy movement in a new direction. Despite the meteoric rise of the lo-
calist movement through the protest events from 2011 to 2015, its fragmented
nature, as well as subsequent state responses, namely electoral disqualification
and counter-mobilisations, have dampened the nascent movement and created
a divided structure of contestation among the opposition.
The divided structure of contestation has serious implications for Hong
Kong’s embattled pro-democracy movement. While scholars such as Ma
Ngok have long pointed to the internal schisms within the pro-democracy
camp over the tactics in fighting for constitutional reforms (Ma 2011), a
new divide has now emerged, which is based on whether one endorses the
legitimacy of Hong Kong as a Special Administration Region under “one
country, two systems.” Under the new division, it is expected that pro-in-
dependence and pro-self-determination activists will continue to be ex-
cluded from the political system by legal and administrative measures, while
being socially marginalised through pro-regime countermovements. Some
localist groups are attempting to circumvent these exclusionary measures
by building grassroots support in communities (shequ 社區) in preparation
for the District Council elections; but whether they will be barred from run-
ning on legal grounds remains unclear. 
Moreover, under the authoritarian grip of President Xi Jinping, who has
overseen a sweeping crackdown on civil society in mainland China, the Chi-
nese government is expected to continue ruling Hong Kong with hard-line
policies. The recent national anthem legislation, and the rhetorical support
for reviving national security legislation, are examples of Beijing’s tightening
grip in trying to outlaw speech and actions supporting independence and
self-determination. Meanwhile, opposition permitted inside the system will
continue to face the dilemma of how to best challenge the authorities and
press for democratic reforms. To secure their positions, these oppositions
might learn to toe the line and avoid making progressive claims on the au-
thorities. The government, on the other hand, will continue to manipulate
the boundaries just to keep the political opposition divided. Until a cohesive
united front can be formed among the democratic opposition, and unless
Beijing is willing to relax its authoritarian grip and hold out an olive branch,
it is difficult to imagine any possibilities for Hong Kong to embark on gen-
uine political reforms.
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